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NOTES
THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST PRIVILEGE AND THE
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TORT: Campbell v. Seabury Press
Plaintiff sought damages for invasion of privacy' from the
author and publisher of a book entitled Brother To A Dragonfly.'
While she did not deny that the revelations made in the book were
true, plaintiff maintained that they tortiously invaded her privacy
by exposing intimacies of her marital and home life to public view.
The district court granted summary judgment based on the ground
that the disclosures were privileged by the public interest test man-
dated by the first amendment.' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed' and held that in actions involving publicity given
to private life, the first amendment mandates the recognition of the
privilege to publish or broadcast facts, events, and information
relating to public figures and the privilege to publish or broadcast
news or other matters of public interest. Campbell v. Seabury
Press, 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1890).
Before 1890' neither English nor American courts granted relief
for tortious interferences with the right of privacy.' While there
were earlier cases which had upheld the "right to be let alone,"7 for-
1. She also sought damages for libel. The district court, in an unpublished
opinon, granted summary judgment on this claim as well. The court of appeals affirmed.
614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980). The claim for libel will not be discussed further, as it is
not the subject of this note.
2. W. CAMPBELL, BROTHER To A DRAGONFLY (1977). The book is a complex work
which explores the development and maturation of the religious views of its author,
plaintiffs brother-in-law, as influenced by plaintiffs husband.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law .. .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
4. The court reasoned that the marital home life of the plaintiff was of public in-
terest. Since the book was an account of the fraternal relationship of plaintiffs hus-
band and his brother, there was a logical connection between her home life and the
subject matter of the book. This "logical nexus" was sufficient to allow invocation of
the public interest privilege by the author and his publisher.
5. The origins of tortious invasion of privacy are found in an article published
that year. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
6. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971). But see Denis v. Leclerc, 1
Mart. (O.S.) 297 (La. 1811) (plaintiff prevented the publication of a letter that had been
sent to a third party).
7. Reviewing earlier cases which protected what was generally termed the
"right to be let alone," Warren and Brandeis concluded that there was a "broader prin-
ciple entitled to separate recognition." RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A. The
"right to be let alone" was first recognized in T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (1879) (the
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mal recognition of the right of privacy did not occur until 1905.8
Thereafter, almost every jurisdiction which has considered the ques-
tion has upheld the existence of the right9 on common law" or
statutory grounds."
right to one's person may be said to be a right to complete anonymity: to be left
alone). See Note, On Washing Dirty Linen In Public: Privacy and the First Amend-
ment, 39 LA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 n.3 (1979).
8. Georgia accepted invasion of privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life In-
surance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.2d 68 (1905), an appropriation and false light case in
which the plaintiff prevailed on a claim that an insurance company had used his
photograph and fabricated endorsement in an advertisement. While Georgia has been
considered the first state to recognize the right to privacy, see W. PROSSER, supra note
4, at 803-04, Louisiana should share this honor. In 1905 Louisiana held that the right to
privacy prevented the photographs of persons not yet convicted from being placed in a
rogues' gallery. See Schulman v. Whitaker, 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737 (1905); Itzkovitch v.
Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905). The Itzkovitch court stated:
We think that the publication of an innocent man's photograph in the rogues'
gallery gives rise to sufficient grounds to sustain an injunction. There is a right in
equity to protect a person from such an invasion of private rights. Everyone who
does not violate the law can insist upon being let alone (the right of privacy). In
such a case the right of privacy is absolute.
115 La. at 480-81, 39 So. at 500. The court was not influenced by the earlier cases
which had declined to recognize a right to privacy, finding that they "are not germane
to the subject which we have . . .given attention." 115 La. at 483, 39 So. at 501.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A. Contra Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis.
430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956) (Wisconsin does not recognize an action for invasion of
privacy). Wisconsin, however, is one of only four states which explicitly rejects tor-
tious invasion of privacy, and "recent surveys show the right to be recognized in all
but a very few jurisdictions." Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and
First Amendment Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 1385, 1386
n.7 (1976). For a discussion of the adoption of invasion of privacy in Louisiana, see
generally F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE § 191 in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 247
(1977); Comment, The Right of Privacy in Louisiana, 28 LA. L. REV. 469 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Afro-Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Travers v.
Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958).
11. See e.g., Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v.
Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, 236 N.Y.S.2d 216, 37 Misc. 2d 599 (1962).
It is certain in Louisiana that tortious invasion of privacy is an action which has a
statutory foundation. In Jaubert v. Crowley Post Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386 (1979),
the supreme court found that "[w]here an individual has ... a right [to privacy] ...
other members of society have a corresponding duty not to violate that right. A viola-
tion constitutes a breach of duty, or fault, and may be actionable under C.C. 2315,
which provides that '[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."' Id. at 1388-89.
There is also the possibility that the action for tortious invasion of privacy has a
constitutional foundation. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides express recogni-
tion of the right to privacy in article I, section 5: "Every person shall be secure in his
person, property, communications, houses papers and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy." However, a constitutional privacy right
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One type of invasion of privacy involves giving publicity to
may be limited to protection from invasions by the state. The court in Jaubert v.
Crowley Post Signal Inc., 368 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 371 So.
2d 617, rev'd, 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979), granted the action for tortious invasion of
privacy constitutional status when it awarded damages for the publication, on the
front page of the newspaper, of a photograph which depicted plaintiff's residence and
which was captioned "[o]ne of Crowley's stately homes, a bit weatherworn and
unkempt, stands in the shadow of a spreading oak." The court revealed that it was
"faced with two competing forces of constitutional rights, ite., the individual's right of
privacy and freedom of the press." 368 So. 2d at 477. On certiorari, the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is "no right to privacy attache[d] to
material in public view." 375 So. 2d at 1391. As to the third circuit court of appeal's
finding that the right to privacy had constitutional status, the court stated that "[iun
deciding the case before us, it is not necessary that we reach the broad question of the
extent to which freedom of the press may be limited by an ordinary citizen's right to
privacy." Id. at 1390. However, the court did address the matter:
The right of privacy under discussion here is one which protects the individual
against private action and is grounded in tort. It should be distinguished from the
constitutional right to privacy which the United States Supreme Court, in a line
of cases, has found to emanate from certain provision of the Bill of Rights and to
protect, from governmental invasion only, those personal rights which are deemed
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Schopler, Annotation,
The Supreme Court's Views as to the Federal Legal Aspects of the Right to
Privacy, 43 L.Ed. 2d 871 (1975). The Louisiana Constition of 1974, Art. I, § 5 ...
reference to a right to privacy represents a change from the language of earlier
constitutions. A review of Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of
1973: Convention Transcripts leaves open the question of whether the section was
intended to provide constitutional protection against private conduct. Generally,
the provision seems to have been drafted as a counterpart to the United States
Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against governmental searches and
seizures and other forms of "authoritarian intrusion." Transcripts, Vol. VI, 1072.
However, in The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1 (1974), Professor Hargrave concluded that the protection afforded
by the provision is not limited to state action because this phrase "no law shall . .
" is conspicuously absent and because the provision does not appear among
those sections dealing with procedural rights in criminal cases. He predicted that
the provision would be a fertile field for future developments in the law of torts.
At least one delegate was also of the opinion that "this proposal protects a person
not only from state action but also from private action." Transcripts, Vol. VI,
1076. In Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), writ denied,
1979, the court found that Art. I. § 5 would prohibit the disclosure of certain city
employee performance reports; but in that case the reports were in the custody of
the City of Lafayette, so that disclosure might have been seen as state action.
Id. at 1388-89 n.2. This discussion may imply that the right to be free from tortious in-
vasions of privacy has a constitutional foundation. Additional support for this view is
found in footnote 2 of the Jaubert decision, where the court, finding that "[an ac-
tionable invasion of privacy occurs only when the defendant's conduct is
unreasonable," stated that "Article I, § 5 of the 1974 Constitution provides protection
against unreasonable . . . invasions of privacy" and referred to note 2 of the decision,
discussed above. Id. at 1389 n.4.
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private life. 2 In Melvin v. Reid," the leading case 14 awarding
damages for public disclosure of private facts," plaintiff, a reformed
prostitute, successfully recovered when a motion picture revived
past events of her life. Since the Melvin decision, publicity given to
private life has received widespread recognition and is considered to
be one of the four actions which may cast a defendant in damages
for invasion of privacy."6
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A:
(1) One who invades the privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by . . .
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in §
652D.
§ 652D provides that:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is sub-
ject to liabilty to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is
of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not a
legitimate concern to the public.
13. 122 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
14. An earlier case, Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 867 (1927), involved a
defendant cast in damages for posting a notice in his window stating that plaintiff
would not pay his debts.
15. The essential common law elements of an action for public disclosure of
private facts are (1) publicity given to private life, (2) which is of no public concern, and
(3) which would cause shame and humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Bern-
stein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.C.D.C. 1955), aff'd 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956). A "mores test" is commonly applied to
determine if the publicized matter is "highly offensive to a reasonable person." W.
PROSSER, supra note 6, at 812. Under this test, the ordinary views and customs of the
community are examined to decide if the publicity would be regarded generally as
highly objectionable. Id. Malice is usually not required, and motive for the publication
is irrelevant. See Cunningham v. Securities Investment Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1960), rehearing denied, 281 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1960): Dawson v. Associated
Fin. Services Co. of Kansas, Inc., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974); Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists
Credit Bureau, 27 Wash. 2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947); Lucus v. Ludwig, 313 So. 2d 12
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 So. 2d 42 (La. 1975); Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc.,
296 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 415 S.W.2d
582 (Ky. App. Ct. 1967); Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
16. The Restatement of Torts provides the following definitions for each of the
four types of invasion of privacy actions:
§ 652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion.
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liabilty to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
§ 652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.
§ 652D. Publicity Given to Private Life
The privilege for public disclosure of matters of public interest
developed concomitant with the invasion of privacy action. The
origins of the privilege are found in an analogy drawn to the
privilege of "fair comment" available in common law defamation ac-
tions. 8 The public interest, or newsworthiness, privilege has been
widely, if not universally, accepted. 9
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is sub-
ject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is
of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light.
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if
(a) .the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652B, C, D & E (1977). See also W. PROSSER, supra note
6, at 389-92.
Louisiana has recognized each of these types of invasions of privacy: (1) Intru-
sion-Love v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972)
(plaintiffs home was entered by some of his fellow employees); (2) Appropria-
tiofi-McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) (plaintiffs photograph
was used in a "before and after" advertisement for defendant's health club); (3) Public
Disclosure-Lambert v. Dow Chemical Co., Inc., 215 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968)
(plaintiffs medical photographs were used in an employee safety campaign by his
employer); (4) False light-Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., 296 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974) (plaintiff, a lawyer, complained because a radio advertisement indicated that
he was selling used cars).
It is clear from Jaubert v. Crowley Post Signal Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979),
rev'd, 368 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), that Louisiana's invasion of privacy action
is not available in any case not described by the four categories. The award of
damages for the publication of a photograph of plaintiffs house on the front page of a
local newspaper accompanied with a caption indicating that the house was not being
properly maintained was reversed because the court concluded that the actions of
defendant did not interfere with one of the four recognized "privacy interests." 375 So.
2d at 1390-91.
17. Warren and Brandeis recognized the privilege in their 1890 article. Warren
and Brandeis, supra note 5, at 214.
18. Warren and Brandeis concluded that "the right to privacy does not prohibit
the publication of any matter which is of public or general interest." Id. at 214.
19. See, e.g., Cordel v. Detective Publ., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968),
affl'd, 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969); Garner v. Triangle Pub., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); Leopold v. Levin, 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970); Waters v. Fleetwood, 212
Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956); Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., Inc., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953);
Mahaffey v. Official Detective Stories, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. La. 1962); Meetze v.
Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1956); Buzinski v. Doall Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191,
175 N.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1961).
The public interest privilege was adopted in Alabama, the state from which the in-
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Supreme Court involvement in the invasion of privacy area has
granted the public interest privilege constitutional significance. The
Supreme Court's initial decision in the privacy field, Time, Inc. v.
Hill,2" involved an action brought under New York law,' which
allowed recovery for public disclosure of matters of public interest
when the disclosures were false.2 The Court ruled that the "con-
stitutional protections of speech and press preclude the application
of the New York statute to redress false reports on matters of
public interest in the absence of the proof that the defendant
published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth."2
The Hill decision, which involved an application of the public in-
terest privilege to "false light" cases, was extended to cases involv-
ing public disclosure of private facts in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn." The Court held that the father of a deceased rape victim
could not constitutionally maintain a privacy action against defen-
dants for their public disclosure of the victim's name during televi-
stant case arose, in Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So. 2d 118, 120 (1948), wherein
the court stated:
[T]he right of privacy does not prohibit the broadcast of matter which is of
legitimate public or general interest .... It does not exist ...in the ordinary
dissemination of news and events, nor in connection with the life of a person in
whom the public has a rightful interest, nor where the information would be of
public benefit."
20. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). A play was written about the experiences of a family held
hostage in its home by escaped convicts. This dramatization, later adapted into a
novel, did not mention the name of the family. An article appeared in Life three years
later, claiming that the play and novel were reenactments of the experiences of the
Hill family. The article was supplemented by pictures of the actors from the play pos-
ing in scenes from the drama taken at the Hill's former home. Id. at 377-78. The play
depicted the terrorized family as victims of tremendous physical abuse. In fact, the
Hill family had made it clear that they were well-treated by their captors. Id. at 378.
The "false light" in which Hill and his family were placed was the basis of the suit.
21. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948) (originally enacted as ch. 132,
[1903] N.Y. LAWS 308).
22. The New York courts have construed the statute well beyond its terms to
allow recovery for fictionalized public disclosure of newsworthy facts. See Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879
(1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239, on remand, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
23. 385 U.S. 387-88. The "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth"
formulation is the malice standard first articulated by the Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 274 (1964), where the Court held that a public official could
.not maintain a libel action for the defamatory remark related to his official conduct
wihout proving that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with
a reckless disregard of the statement's falsity.
24. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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sion coverage of the trial of the alleged rapists. The Court based its
decision on the right of the press to report matters, such as crimes
and judicial proceedings, which are "without question events of
legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the
responsibility of the press to report." 5
In the instant case, Campbell v. Seabury Press,' plaintiffs claim
for relief was dismissed in a per curiam opinion. Employing the
assumption that Hill and Cohn stand for the proposition that "the
first amendment mandates a constitutional privilege applicable to
those torts of invasion of privacy that involve publicity,"27 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals squarely held that the privilege for mat-
ters of public interest was constitutionally required in all cases of
public disclosure of public facts. Campbell's view of a constitutionally
required, broad public interest privilege28 mirrors the jurisprudence
of other jurisdictions.' However, Campbell assumes a more expan-
sive posture than the previous decisions rendered by the United
States Supreme Court in the invasion of privacy arena.3 ° Further-
more, this expansion is unwarranted and represents a grave threat
to the existence of the public disclosure action.
The Campbell court, citing Time, Inc. v. Hill" as requiring that
the public interest privilege be available as a limitation on liability
in all privacy suits, followed the interpretation commonly made by
lower courts.2 However, a careful reading of the decision illustrates
that this interpretation is overly broad.33 It has been observed that
25. Id at 492 (emphasis added).
26. 614 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 397.
28. In fact, the decision holds that there are "two distinct" privileges required by
the first amendment, one for the publication of information about public figures and
the other for information in the public interest. But, as Dean Prosser has observed, the
privileges have become "practically so merged as to be inseparable." W. PROSSER.
supra note 6, at 823.
29. As of 1963 no public disclosure case had raised the first amendment as a
defense protecting the rights of the press to disclose publicly private facts. Comment,
Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1469 n.36 (1973). However,
several jurisdictions now place the public interest privilege upon a constitutional foun-
dation. E.g., McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162, 538 P.2d 804
(1975); Taylor v. KTVB, Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974).
30. It has been correctly observed that, "[n]o Supreme Court decision squarely
[addresses] the question of the standard of protection afforded by the first amendment
for truthful public disclosure of private facts." Comment, First Amendment Limita-
tions on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 CHI. L. REV., 180, 182 (1977).
31. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
32. See note 29, supra.
33. "Because state law required that recovery be based on falsity, the Court ...
could only take into account the plaintiff's interest in reputation. Hill's other privacy
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"[tihe combination of the circumstances [of the case] with the Court's
refusal to intimate any views about the public disclosure tort0 sug-
gests that the lower courts and commentators [as well as the court
in Campbell] have found more guidance in Hill than is warranted.""5
In finding that the "constitutional privilege clearly applies to the
tort charged in this action: the public disclosure of private facts," 6
the Campbell court relied upon Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.7
This interepretation of Cohn, however, is also unwarranted, for the
decision is not as broad as its language implies. The Court was will-
ing to find unconstitutional the sanctions imposed against the press
in Cohn because there was no substantial privacy interest in infor-
mation already on the public record. This leaves unsettled the ques-
tion of what the constitutional limitations on the privacy action
should be in cases where the interest against public disclosure is
great. Moreover, the Court specifically declined to address the ques-
tion of the compatability of the tort with the first amendment.'
The overly expansive interpretation of Cohn and Hill reflects a
failure by the Campbell court to consider Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.39 In a suit for damages in the related area of libel, the Supreme
Court in Gertz held that states validly may impose liability on those
who publish defamatory remarks without regard for the publisher's
malice toward the victim when the victim is a "private," as opposed
to a "public," figure, so long as the states do not impose liability
without fault. In so holding, the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia,4" which held that "all discussions and communications
involving matters of public or general concern" triggered the protec-
interests, however, may well have been affected also: his individuality interests in
preventing disclosure of at least partially private information." Comment, An Accom-
modation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment Rights in Public Disclosure
Cases, 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 1385, 1402 n.106 (1976). Thus, given the proper factual set-
ting, balancing the interests will result in giving greater protection to a plaintiff in an
action for public disclosure of private truthful facts than in an action for disclosure of
private facts in a false light. See Minner, The Right to Speak from Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 961
(1968). But see W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 817-18; Warren and Brandeis, supra note
5, at 216.
34. The court specifically withheld deciding the question of constitutional
privilege in matters of publicity given to private life when the publicity involves mat-
ters "so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notion of decency." 385 U.S. at 383 n.7.
35. Comment, supra note 30, at 184.
36. 614 F.2d at 397.
37. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
38. Id. at 491.
39. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
40. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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tion from liability provided by the knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard standard,4 was severely criticized, if not overruled.
The Gertz decision makes it clear that the constitution does not
require rigid application of the public interest standard in defama-
tion cases. In matters where private individuals are defamed, the
mere fact that the subject of the publication was of public interest
has no magic significance as far as constitutional protections for the
press are concerned. Rather, the interest of the individual in pre-
serving his reputation must be balanced against the press' right to
inform the public. 2 However, the Campbell court has found that the
first amendment requires that in privacy cases the public interest
privilege must be automatically available, without regard for the
privacy interest at stake. In fact, the Campbell court held that "[tihe
ambit of protection offered by the ...privilege often encompasses
information relating to individuals who either have not sought or
have attempted to avoid publicity."' 3 While it generally is conceded
that the interests protected by the state in defamation and invasion
of privacy actions are different," the justification for the Campbell
court's failure to follow the retrenchment from the absolute public
interest standard represented in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." is not
so apparent as not to warrant explanation."6
The Campbell decision is especially disquieting because, in addi-
tion to the unwarranted expansion and departure from previous
41. Id. at 44.
42. 418 U.S. at 343.
43. 614 F.2d at 397.
44. Defamation generally concerns one's interest in reputation, while privacy con-
cerns peace of mind. See Kelly v. Johnson Pub. Co., 325 P.2d 659 (Cal. App. 1958). A
better view is that the action for invasion of privacy is designed to promote emotional
stability. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 412-15 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Blous-
tein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 970-71 (1964). The confines of the interest against public disclosure
have been set at publicity given to details of one's sexual activities, health, and distant
past, for nothing else is "genuinely damaging." See Comment, supra note 33, at 1411.
45. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
46. See Comment, supra note 33, at 1402-06, where it is argued that:
[Tihe broad public interest test of Time, Inc. v. Hill is no longer viable in the
public disclosure cases. Rather, to be congruent with current constitutional doc-
trine, a test for the permissibility of recovery in public disclosure cases must in-
corporate two stages. First, the precise individual interest being protected by the
state must be important enough to survive initial scrutiny by a court. Second,
even where this interest rises to the threshold level of legitimacy, there must be
a further inquiry to determine whether there is a legitimate public interest which
requires protection for the press.
Id. at 1406. But see Comment, supra note 30, at 186-87.
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Supreme Court privacy decisions that Campbell represents, 7 the
holding makes it difficult, if not impossible, to find a place for the
public interest privilege and the public disclosure tort as well.
Depending upon who is defining "public interest," sole reliance upon
the newsworthiness test, as required by the Campbell holding, will
result in either a lack of protection of individual interests or a lack
of protection for the press. Unless the courts strike the proper
balance between the individual's right to be free from invasions of
privacy and the right of the press to inform the citizenry, a test
making all matters of public interest privileged will erode seriously
the protection afforded against media "overstepping," which is at
the root of the tort," since in most cases the press itself determines
what is of public interest.49
The obstacle represented by the Campbell decision to striking
the proper balance between press and citizenry becomes almost in-
surmountable because the privilege of newsworthiness never has
been limited to news in the sense of "current events."50 Rather, the
traditional formulation "extends to all information concerning in-
teresting phases of human activity and embraces all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate so that an individual
may cope with the exigencies of their period."'" Thus, the cost of
protecting the media is the evisceration of the public disclosure ac-
tion.2 It was precisely this result which caused the leading critic of
47. Some courts have held that the newsworthiness defense does not have con-
stitutional status. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34,
43, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1977) (limited reading given to Hill); Commonwealth v. Wiseman,
356 Mass. 251, 261, 249 N.E.2d 610, 617 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970) (Hill
distinguished as a case where the public interest outweighed the privacy interest).
48. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 5, at 196.
49. One writer has noted that
[Wihen newsworthiness is defined in terms of demonstrable public interest in the
particular facts disclosed, courts will not ordinarily review a publisher's decision
that a particular story is newsworthy. . . . Publishers generally print only what
they believe to be of interest to their readers, and judges are wisely hesitant to
second-guess their publisher's business judgment[s]. . . . There are no standards
by which judges can quantitatively assess the popular interest in a particular
news item.
Comment, supra note 30, at 192. This was exactly the sentiment expressed by the
court in Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 484 F.2d 150, 156-57 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 419 U.S. 245 (1974): "The judgment of what is newsworthy must remain
primarily a function of the publisher .... Only in cases of flagrant breach of privacy ...
should a court substitute its judgment for that of the publisher."
50. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 825. In Hill, the Court found that "we have no
doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of the new play linked to an ac-
tual incident, is a matter of public interest." 385 U.S. at 388.
51. 614 F.2d at 397.
52. An example of the precise effect of the constitutionally required public in-
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the invasion of privacy tort to claim that the first amendment
privilege tol publish what is newsworthy is "so over-powering as vir-
tually to swallow the tort."53
Assuming that the first amendment requires a public interest
privilege and that it be strictly applied in all actions for public
disclosure of private facts, the result in Campbell is correct. Rigid
application of the public interest standard was employed to find that
a woman, who had maintained complete anonymity throughout her
life, had marital and homelife intimacies which were of public in-
terest simply because there was a "logic nexus"5 between the in-
timacies and the life of her brother-in-law. Predictably, 5 the court
refused to interfere with the publisher's determination that the life
of the brother-in-law was of public interest, despite the fact that the
autobiography is a self-proclamation of its author's status as a civil
rights leader.
If the result in Campbell is a product of the proper application
of the facts of the case to its holding, the future of the invasion of
privacy action for public disclosure of private life is bleak.51 Camp-
bell plainly serves to underscore the necessity of finding a more at-
tractive alternative method of reconciling the public disclosure ac-
terest privilege can be found in McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M.
162, 538 P.2d 804 (1975). A newspaper published the names of five police officers who
had been involved in a gun battle with a group known as the "Black Berets." The
names and addresses of the police officers and the wives were disclosed because the
police had refused to cooperate with the newspaper in discussing the incident. After
the officers began to receive threatening phone calls, the officers brought suit for inva-
sion of privacy. The court of appeal of New Mexico affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment. A constitutionally required privilege for matters of public interest
was recognized. The court, refusing to speculate on whether or not the names and ad-
dresses were newsworthy, found that the newspaper could take advantage of the
privilege because "[ilt is the usual practice in newspaper accounts to identify persons
by giving their names and addresses ...." 88 N.M. at 167, 538 P.2d at 809.
53. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 336 (1966).
54. 614 F.2d at 397. It cannot be denied that the life of the plaintiff and the
defendant-author were logically connected. But then, it is difficult to imagine any per-
son who is not logically connected to someone of public interest.
55. See note 49, supra.
56. The Campbell case represents an attempt by the plaintiff to vindicate a very
strong privacy interest. Marital privacy has long been recognized as one of the
strongest of the privacy interests. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (sexual
relations are normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels); W. PROSSER,
supra note 6, at 829 (private sexual relations are still not in the public domain).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1965), provides judicial recognitiion of the right
against governmental intrusion into marital privacy. If the right to marital privacy
could not overcome the public interest privilege in Campbell it is unlikely that there
will be a factual setting which can.
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tion with the first amendment,57 or of simply abandoning the action"
as one that is incompatible with first amendment guarantees. 9
Robert Elton Arceneaux
Rhode Island v. Innis: A HEAVY BLOW TO THE RIGHTS OF A SUSPECT
IN CUSTODY; AND NO "CHRISTIAN BURIAL" TO EASE THE PASSAGE
Defendant, Thomas J. Innis, was arrested on January 17, 1975,
in connection with an armed robbery that had occurred earlier the
same morning. He immediately was advised of his Miranda rights1
by the arresting officer and was given the same warnings a few
moments later when other policemen arrived on the scene. The
defendant indicated that he wished to have a lawyer, was placed in
a car with three police officers, and was en route to the station
house when the officers began conversing among themselves:
"there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area,
57. Bloustein argues persuasively that the Meikeljohn theory, which was the basis
for the Supreme Court's holding in New York Times v. Sullivan, and which the Court
misapplied in Time, Inc. v. Hill, is the solution to the problem of balancing the right to
privacy with the right to free speech. The Meikeljohn theory, as explained by Blous-
tein, provides that the right to free speech under the first amendment only attaches to
matters which contribute to the public's understanding essential to self-government. In
other words, the only issues of legitimate public interest are those with which the
voters must deal. Were the courts to apply this theory in deciding what is news-
worthy, there would be protection for the press and room for the right against public
disclosure of private facts as well. See Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitu-
tion: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L.
REV. 611, 624-28 (1968). See generally Comment, supra note 30; Comment, supra note
33.
58. Some have argued that this may be the proper course of action. Compare
Kalven, supra note 49, with Bloustein, supra note 57.
59. Despite the Campbell decision, there may still be a right to privacy when the
publisher of the private facts is not a member of the "institutional press." In Norris v.
King, 355 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 995, rehearing
denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978), the court awarded damages when a laundromat owner
posted posters of plaintiff, who had stolen from defendant's coke machines, in an at-
tempt to warn others that they would be caught if they repeated plaintiff's actions.
The court did not address itself to the line of cases which have been interpreted as re-
quiring a public interest privilege. Instead, the court merely found that those cases
were not applicable, since defendant was not a member of the news media. 355 So. 2d
at 24-25. However, it has been argued that the distinction between members of the in-
stitutional press and ordinary citizens for the purpose of application of the public in-
terest privilege may be invalid. See Note, supra note 7, at 1221-22.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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